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THE  WAY  FORWARD  AFTER WAL-MART
George Rutherglen
The Supreme Court’s decision denying certification of a class
action in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 elicited a strong dissent from
Justice Ginsburg,2 and widespread criticism in liberal circles,3 but in
several important respects, the decision was unanimous.  All the Jus-
tices agreed that a class action could not be certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2),4 the rule that governs class actions
in which injunctive relief is “appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.”5  Instead, the class could be certified (if at all) only under the
more stringent provisions of Rule 23(b)(3),6 typically reserved for
 2012 George Rutherglen.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
1 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2 Id. at 2561–67 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 E.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 134–54 (2011) (criti-
cizing Wal-Mart for diminishing plaintiffs’ access to court); Suzette M. Malveaux, How
Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLO-
QUY 34, 35 (2011), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/lawreview/
Colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18Malveaux.pdf (“[The decision is a] major blow to
the plaintiffs’ case because of the unique and powerful role of a class action.”).
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and if the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declar-
atory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”).
5 Id.
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Subdivision (b)(3) states:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings
include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions;
871
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damage class actions.7  The holding that divided the Justices con-
cerned the failure of the plaintiffs’ case to meet the requirement of
Rule 23(a)(2) that there were “questions of law or fact common to the
class.”8  On this issue, the five Justices conventionally identified as con-
servative were in the majority and the liberals were in dissent.  Yet
even on this issue there were points of apparent agreement, and one
of them was the need to inquire into the merits to determine whether
the prerequisites for certification were satisfied.9  On this point, the
majority and the dissenters disagreed only over how strong the plain-
tiffs’ evidence on the merits really was.
As that disagreement makes clear, a consideration of the merits
deeply affects almost all certification decisions.  If Wal-Mart had actu-
ally discriminated against women in pay and promotions, as Justice
Ginsburg plainly suspected it had,10 then the argument for certifica-
tion would have been strengthened by the need to prevent future dis-
crimination and to compensate victims of past discrimination.  If, on
the contrary, the evidence was too weak to support this conclusion, as
Justice Scalia argued for the majority,11 then certification should have
been denied.  What is true in the particular case also is true for entire
categories of litigation: the more meritorious the underlying claim of
class-wide liability, the stronger the arguments for certification.  Part I
of this article situates this commonly accepted observation in the per-
ennial disputes over substance and procedure within the specific con-
text of class actions, both for the Title VII claims at issue in Wal-Mart
and for class actions generally.
The opinion in Wal-Mart expands upon this observation in a dif-
ferent direction, by disapproving a broad interpretation of the hold-
ing in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin12 that an inquiry into the merits
cannot be used to shift the cost of notice to the defendant immedi-
ately upon certification of a class action. Wal-Mart makes the merits a
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.
7 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61 (majority opinion).
8 Id. at 2550–57.
9 See id. at 2552 n.6.
10 See id. at 2562–64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(giving examples of sex discrimination resulting from subjective decision-making).
11 Id. at 2552–57 (majority opinion).
12 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
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component of the certification process, first, by requiring the party
seeking certification to “affirmatively demonstrate” that the require-
ments of Rule 23 have been met; and second, by recognizing that such
proof usually involves an examination of the merits.13  Prior cases and
previous commentary have recognized these points, but these sources
fail to articulate exactly what an inquiry into the merits entails, or how
it relates to other procedural devices that involve an examination of
the merits before trial, such as motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and motions for summary judgment.14  Part II of this article
examines this issue and seeks to put certification decisions in their
proper place within the structure of civil litigation, consisting of plead-
ing, discovery, and summary judgment, followed by settlement or trial.
That inquiry, in turn, leads to the larger question of how to
reform class action procedure.  If “one size does not fit all,” as John
Coffee has previously pointed out, then it is the merits that determine
which size fits in different class actions, both in quantitative terms—in
determining the optimal number of class members—and in qualita-
tive terms—in defining the scope and procedure for different class
actions.15  As Richard Marcus has recently emphasized, an examina-
tion of the merits is crucial to the gatekeeping function of federal
courts in controlling aggregate litigation.16  An inquiry into the merits
hardly resolves all the pressing questions raised by class actions as we
have them now, but it offers a place to start in framing solutions tai-
lored to the need for aggregate litigation in different areas of law.
Part III argues that an inquiry into the merits provides a suitable vehi-
cle for considering changes in class action practice.  Even such seem-
ingly “trans-substantive” requirements as adequacy of representation
can be implemented only by reference to substantive law.  Whether
there are conflicts of interest within the class, or whether the class
13 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551–52.
14 See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“Sometimes
the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests of
the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s claim, and
sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before
coming to rest on the certification question.”); Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans,
Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1279, 1329 (2002) (rec-
ommending a standard of likelihood of success on the merits similar to the standard
used for preliminary injunctions).
15 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 350 (2010).  Less kindly, he found scholarship focused on the
general terms of procedural rules to be “characterized by an incisive rigor—and a
rule-bound tunnel vision.” Id. at 289.
16 Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Mer-
its on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 349–54 (2011).
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attorney can effectively represent the class, cannot be decided without
considering substantive law.  Neither can the choice of whether to cer-
tify a class action be decided under the different subdivisions of Rule
23(b).
In Wal-Mart itself, the Court invoked substantive law in requiring
certification of class actions for back pay under subdivision (b)(3).17
The Court rejected “Trial by Formula” as an impermissible infringe-
ment on the defendant’s right to oppose individual relief to any par-
ticular class member.18  The Rules Enabling Act19 and the Due
Process Clause,20 according to the Court, required the preservation of
rights once conferred by substantive law and prevented certification of
claims for back pay under subdivision (b)(2).  Yet even accepting this
conclusion, a close look at the substantive law under Title VII supports
the consideration of approximate remedies in certification deci-
sions—not because the courts can require “Trial by Formula,” but
because the parties often engage in “Settlement by Formula.”  The
tendency towards this form of settlement constitutes a proper consid-
eration in deciding whether common issues predominate over individ-
ual issues as required by subdivision (b)(3).
Looking to the merits provides a way to differentiate among class
actions, both in fine-grained analysis of particular claims and in broad
terms defined by different areas of law.  The cases and commentary
on class actions presume that class actions must be divided into con-
ventional categories, such as mass torts, consumer class actions, civil
rights claims, and securities class actions, but they provide little more
than a pragmatic justification for this division.21  A look at the merits
reveals how closely procedure and substance are fused together in
class action practice, and paradoxically enough, how disaggregated
the treatment of class actions must be.  This was tacitly accepted as the
premise of most analyses of class actions before Wal-Mart.  It is now
the only way forward after it.
I. SOME REALISM ABOUT RESULTS: WHY THE MERITS MATTER
Even a casual look at the opinions in Wal-Mart reveals the differ-
ent attitudes of the majority and the dissent to the merits of the case.
Where Justice Scalia expressed skepticism of the plaintiffs’ evidence of
17 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560 (citing the remedial provisions of Title VII to clas-
sify backpay as neither an injunctive nor declaratory relief).
18 Id. at 2560–61.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 86–90. R
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sex discrimination, Justice Ginsburg regarded it with evident sympa-
thy, as an example of pervasive preconceptions about gender roles.
She effectively turned his skepticism on its head, transforming the
entire complexion of the case and infusing the contents of Rule 23
with her view of the merits.  The plaintiffs sought to represent a class
of 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart who
had allegedly suffered sex discrimination in the subjective process by
which Wal-Mart’s managers and supervisors made decisions on pay
and promotions.  If the plaintiffs had presented evidence of a stark
disparity—such as the complete absence of women from higher levels
of management or higher levels of compensation—they would have
magnified both the merits of their claim and their arguments for cer-
tification.  The clearer and larger the wrong, the greater the need for
aggregate litigation in order to remedy it.  The “inexorable zero” of
no representation of women in better paying jobs, as an early Title VII
decision called it,22 would have supported both a finding of a pattern
or practice of discrimination and certification of a correspondingly
broad class action.
As the record stood in Wal-Mart, the evidence fell far short of
such clarity.  The existence of a disparity in the pay and promotions of
women was taken for granted, both within Wal-Mart as compared to
men and outside Wal-Mart as compared to the promotion of women
in other stores.  The district court relied on
largely uncontested descriptive statistics which show that women
working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every
region, . . . that the salary gap widens over time even for men and
women hired into the same jobs at the same time, that women take
longer to enter into management positions, and that the higher one
looks in the organization the lower the percentage of women.23
The district court also found that women constituted about sixty-
five percent of hourly employees, but only thirty-three percent of
management employees.24  Connecting that disparity to the subjective
decisions of Wal-Mart’s many supervisors and managers presented the
critical problem in the plaintiffs’ case.  The evidence of systemic dis-
crimination came in three forms: anecdotal evidence of discrimina-
tion in the experience of the named plaintiffs and 120 other members
of the class; a regression analysis finding national and regional dispari-
22 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (quot-
ing United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1975)).
23 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 155 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d in
part and remanded in part, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
24 Id. at 146.
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ties in the rates of pay and promotion of women at Wal-Mart; and the
expert testimony of a sociologist that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture
made the discretionary decisions of managers and supervisors suscep-
tible to sex discrimination.25
The majority rejected the adequacy of this evidence to generate
common questions of law and fact, for both empirical and doctrinal
reasons.  The anecdotal evidence suffered from the small number of
individual cases relative to the size of the class, over 100 but still less
than .01% of the entire class, and because of the disjunction between
individual instances of discrimination and issues common to the class.
No aggregation of individual cases, no matter how large, could estab-
lish commonality in the absence of common features among them.
The plaintiffs’ regression analyses sought to control for a variety of
factors that might have legitimately affected pay, such as job perform-
ance and length of time with the company, and found a residual dis-
parity between men and women that could, in their expert’s opinion,
only be explained by sex.26  But that evidence did not, in the major-
ity’s view, connect the pattern of lower pay with the decisions of partic-
ular managers.  That task was left to the evidence of implicit bias.
Apart from other problems with the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert
on this issue, he admitted that he could not say “[w]hether 0.5 per-
cent or 95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be
determined by stereotyped thinking.”27  All in all, that left the major-
ity with the conclusion that in a company of this size, “it is quite unbe-
lievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a
common way without some common direction.”28
The Justices who dissented on the existence of common issues, of
course, took a different view of the evidence, as did the district court,
upon whose opinion the dissenters relied for their view of the facts.29
Justice Ginsburg reached this conclusion:  “The plaintiffs’ evidence,
including class members’ tales of their own experiences, suggests that
gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company culture.”30  Whether or not
she was right, her view of the evidence on the merits undoubtedly
affected her view on the issue of certification, just as it did for the
majority.  That view carried over to substantive legal doctrine under
Title VII, which she interpreted to impose a greater obligation on
employers to counteract the potential bias in subjective decision-mak-
25 Id. at 145–66.
26 Id. at 159.
27 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (alteration in original).
28 Id. at 2555.
29 Id. at 2562–64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 Id. at 2563 (footnote omitted).
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ing by their managers and supervisors.31  She would have filled the
gap between Wal-Mart’s individualized decisions on pay and promo-
tions with a more sympathetic view both of the plaintiffs’ evidence and
the substantive law that supported their claims.  The majority took the
opposite view on this question, insisting on the requirement that the
plaintiffs point to a specific employment practice to prove a claim of
disparate impact under Title VII.32  In the end, the decision in Wal-
Mart may come to stand as much for its insistence on the strict stan-
dards of proof for class claims under Title VII as for its interpretation
of the requirements of Rule 23.
The connection between Title VII and Rule 23 goes back several
decades.  Just as the admonition against considering the merits dates
from Eisen, the necessity of looking to the merits dates from the same
era.  Decisions on both sides were handed down not long after the
amendments to Rule 23 in 1966; and specifically under Title VII, the
Court authorized a limited inquiry into the merits in General Telephone
Co. of Southwest v. Falcon.33  The decision in Falcon figured prominently
in the Court’s analysis of commonality in Wal-Mart, first, in explicitly
qualifying the admonition in Eisen against considering the merits, and
second, in the need to bridge the gap between subjective decision-
making and class-wide issues.34  The Court’s reliance upon Falcon also
undermines a common criticism of Wal-Mart: that the decision consti-
tutes just another example of the conservative judicial activism typical
of the Roberts Court.  Conservative though the decision may be, its
doctrinal roots lie in structural features of class action practice.  In
Falcon, the Court was unanimous in reversing certification of the class,
eliciting only a partial dissent on the need to remand the case at all.35
For that matter, Eisen itself was unanimous in forbidding an inquiry
31 See id. at 2565 (interpreting a prior decision to show the Court’s awareness of
“the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” (quoting Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988))).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
33 457 U.S. 147 (1982).  The Court in Falcon heavily relied on the reasoning in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay that “the class determination generally involves consider-
ations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s
cause of action.’”  437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (quoting Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Lang-
deau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
34 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552–53 & n.6 (majority opinion).
35 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  The precedent on which Falcon relied, East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977), also was unanimous.
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into the merits solely in order to shift the costs of notice onto the
defendant.36
Developments since these early decisions have only succeeded in
emphasizing how fundamental they are to the modern version of Rule
23.  A proposed amendment to the rule to specifically require an
inquiry into “the probable success on the merits of the class claims,
issues, or defenses,” was thoroughly considered by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules, but never approved.37  In the meantime, more
modest changes to the rule have been made, for instance, on the tim-
ing of certification decisions.38  Thus the rule as it stands contains no
independent requirement of probable success on the merits.  Yet, by
the same token, many elements of the rule implicate a consideration
of the merits.  Just to take the most obvious example, a settlement can
be approved only if “it is fair, reasonable, and adequate,”39 a finding
that requires an assessment of how likely class members were to obtain
relief and in what amount and kind.  Commonality, typicality, ade-
quacy of representation, the need for class-wide injunctive or declara-
tory relief, and the predominance of common issues—indeed, the
very definition of the class—all require an analysis of the nature of the
named plaintiffs’ claims.  That analysis presupposes that only substan-
tial claims count—those which have survived at least a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim, which typically precedes a motion for
certification.40  In retrospect, Eisen inevitably had to be limited to
accommodate inquiries into the merits that overlap with the require-
ments of Rule 23.
Falcon not only recognized why the merits mattered on certifica-
tion, but how they mattered.  In this respect, Falcon exhibits a striking
similarity to Wal-Mart.  It, too, involved the step from individualized,
subjective decision-making to claims that the lower court character-
ized as “across-the-board” discrimination.  The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, partly because the plaintiff had lost on his individual claim of
discrimination in promotions in the district court, but mainly because
36 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part) (expressing “general agreement with the phases of this case touched on
by the Court”).
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(E) (Tentative Draft, 1995), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-1995.pdf (Memoran-
dum from Patrick E. Higginbotham, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal Civil
Rules, to Members of the Standing Committee on Rules).
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
40 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 31 (1996).
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this individual claim differed fundamentally from the class claim: it
concerned promotions, while the class claim concerned hiring; and it
involved evidence of intentional discrimination, while the class claim
relied upon statistical evidence of disparate impact.  The connection
between the plaintiff’s individual claim and his class claim was entirely
lacking, as was evidence that would have bridged this gap. Wal-Mart
presented much the same question since it involved individual
instances of discrimination that were scaled up into an attack on gen-
eral practices of subjective decision-making.
The same problem of bridging the gap between the claims of
individual class members and class claims comes up in class actions far
afield from employment discrimination, in areas as different as mass
torts and securities class actions.  The Supreme Court reversed the
certification of a “settlement only” class action in Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor41 partly because of “the disparate questions undermining
class cohesion” on the asbestos claims asserted on behalf of the class.42
These concerned different products, different periods and duration
of exposure, in different ways, resulting in different injuries (or for
some class members, with “exposure only” claims, no injury at all).
The substantive law provided no “glue,”43 to use the term from Wal-
Mart, to hold the class together.  Conversely, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co.,44 the Court approved certification of a class action
based on the presumption of “fraud on the market” applicable to all
purchases of securities in an efficient market.45  The substantive law
supplied the question of materiality common to the class that met the
requirements of Rule 23.  These examples could be multiplied across
other areas of law.46
Upon examination, the influence of the merits on decisions
whether or not to certify a class action is so obvious because the stakes
in such decisions are so large.  If certification is denied, class members
with claims too small to support separate lawsuits have no prospect of
recovery.  As recognized long ago, denial of certification signals the
41 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
42 Id. at 624 (citing reasoning in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
626 (3d Cir. 1996)).
43 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).
44 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
45 Id. at 2185.
46 See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§§ 1776, 1781–1783 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012) (citing cases on application of Rule
23 to class claims in constitutional law, civil rights, antitrust, securities fraud, con-
sumer law, and environmental law).
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“death knell” of the action.47  Granting certification, by contrast, sig-
nals to everyone involved that the case deserves much greater atten-
tion and the investment of further resources, whether by way of
settlement negotiations, discovery, or summary judgment.  The
gatekeeping function of certification identifies those cases worth the
added expense of litigation on a larger scale over a longer period
involving greater complexity.  Although the formal requirements of
Rule 23 depart from a straightforward predictive judgment whether
the costs of such litigation might be worth the benefits, they cannot
exclude it from the urgent practical considerations that must inform
decisions on certification.  The merits necessarily go into any such
judgment.  The question is not whether they do so, but how they
should—a subject taken up in the next part of this Article.
II. SOME FORMALISM ABOUT PROCEDURE: CERTIFICATION IN THE
STRUCTURE OF A CIVIL ACTION
The correct role of the merits in a decision on certification
depends upon the proper place of such a decision in the sequence of
steps that constitute a civil action.  The earlier the certification deci-
sion is made, the more it resembles an issue of pleading and the more
it depends upon the same resources and arguments.  The later it
occurs, the more it can draw on evidence developed for adjudication
and trial.  Placement ultimately is a matter of logic and function, but it
begins as one of timing.  The current version of Rule 23 requires that
decisions on certification be made at “an early practicable time after a
person sues or is sued as a class representative.”48  This provision
replaced one in the 1966 version of the rule that was markedly more
stringent, requiring certification decisions to be made “as soon as
practicable after commencement of the action.”49  The Advisory Com-
mittee justified the change to the current language because the previ-
ous version of the rule “neither reflects prevailing practice nor
captures the many valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial
certification decision.”50  The current version of the rule stands sus-
pended somewhere between “as early as practicable” and no later than
necessary, or in procedural terms, roughly between pleading and sum-
mary judgment.
47 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–77 (1978) (denying inter-
locutory appeal on that ground before amendment adding Rule 23(f) on appeals).
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
49 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: AS
AMENDED THROUGH JULY 1, 1966 (The Foundation Press, Inc. 1967).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee’s notes (2003 amendments).
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Justice Scalia gestured in that direction in Wal-Mart when he
characterized Rule 23 as setting forth more than “a mere pleading
standard.  A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demon-
strate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to
prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common
questions of law or fact, etc.”51  This passage perhaps minimizes the
standards for pleading, which recently have been made stricter,52 but
its emphasis upon proof brings certification of class actions closer to
the merits.  Plaintiffs must present evidence that the requirements of
Rule 23 have been met.  This showing nevertheless leaves proof of
compliance with the rule at one remove from the merits.  The plaintiff
need not demonstrate the elements of a claim, but only that proof of
those elements exhibits the qualities required by the rule.  For certain
claims, those qualities might be established with little or no evidence.
For instance, suppose that Wal-Mart had a policy that limited the avail-
ability of pregnancy leave.53  A plaintiff could establish common issues
simply by proving the existence of this policy, without necessarily
establishing whether it complied with Title VII.  No further proof
would be needed.
The problematic cases resemble Wal-Mart itself, in which a pat-
tern of adverse effects on the basis of race or sex has to be connected
to some specific employment practice.54  These cases also arise more
frequently as remaining forms of discrimination become more subtle
and more difficult to prove.  Employers have every incentive to elimi-
nate general practices that are facially discriminatory, either as a pre-
caution against litigation or in settling claims once litigation occurs.
That leaves for litigation more complicated cases implicating practices
that are not themselves obviously discriminatory but that might be
connected to discriminatory effects.  In those cases, the existence of
common questions under Rule 23 quickly becomes entangled with the
question of class-wide liability.  As Justice Scalia framed the problem,
relying upon the work of Richard Nagareda, it is  “the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
51 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
52 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain suffi-
cient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
53 Cf. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC 462 U.S. 669 (1983)
(holding that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes it clear that it is unlawfully
discriminatory for an employer to exclude pregnancy coverage from an otherwise
inclusive benefits plan).
54 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989).
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resolution of the litigation.”55  The existence of a common answer still
remains distinct from what that common answer is—either liability or
not—although the evidence used to prove the ultimate issue of liabil-
ity plainly overlaps with the derivative issue of commonality.  If the
pattern of discriminatory results has no connection to any discernible
employment practice, a class cannot be certified for the same reason
that the defendant cannot be held liable.  Discriminatory effects alone
do not violate Title VII.  The defendant must be found to have
engaged in some form of prohibited discrimination, and it must be
connected to the harm; just as in tort law a defendant can be held
liable only upon a finding of negligence and proximate cause.
It follows that the plaintiff must present some evidence on the
merits in order to demonstrate compliance with Rule 23 when the
issues overlap.  The crucial question is: how much evidence?  Scholars
who have previously addressed this issue have proposed the showing
necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on
the merits.56  That standard suffers from some ambiguity, which might
make it either too strong or too weak to assess the merits as they are
relevant to certification.  If it is taken literally, it appears to be no dif-
ferent from proof of the merits at trial, which must be by a preponder-
ance of the evidence on most issues in ordinary civil litigation.  A
likelihood of success appears to be the same as proof “more probably
than not.”  In order to avoid this equivalence, courts have discounted
the standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction by requiring
only “some likelihood” of success or a “better than negligible” chance
of success, or more generally, by applying a “sliding scale” that adjusts
the necessary showing according to the relative harm to the parties.57
The greater the harm to the plaintiff in denying the injunction, the
lower the threshold of proof, while the greater the harm to the defen-
dant in granting the injunction, the higher the threshold.58  Conceiva-
55 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009)).
56 Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1329–31; Marcus, supra note 16, at 349.  The R
American Law Institute would go further and require resolution of relevant disputed
issues of fact by a preponderance of the evidence, although it would not make such a
finding binding at trial on the merits. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGRE-
GATE LITIGATION § 2.06 (2010).
57 For all of these strategies invoked in a single opinion, see Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp.,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895, 897 (7th Cir. 2001).
58 Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433–34 (7th Cir. 1986).
Some courts have applied a version of the Hand formula, awarding a preliminary
injunction only if the harm to the plaintiff from denying the injunction, multiplied by
the plaintiff’s likelihood of success at trial, exceeds the harm to the defendant from
granting the injunction, multiplied by the defendant’s probability of success. See
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bly, the standard of proof for certification could be adjusted in similar
fashion to take account of the relative harm of denying or granting
certification, but the baseline for making any such adjustment would
be difficult to discern.  It would take the already discretionary stan-
dards for preliminary injunctions and make them far more indetermi-
nate by forcing the court to predict the consequences of granting or
denying certification.
A further conceptual problem with this standard arises from the
mismatch between directly inquiring into the merits and meeting the
terms of Rule 23.  The merits matter only insofar as they are reflected
in the terms of the rule, in such provisions as those on typicality, com-
monality, and predominance.  The ultimate inquiry into the defen-
dant’s liability makes a difference only insofar as it affects the
derivative inquiry whether that determination can be made on a class-
wide basis.  “Likelihood of success on the merits” does not capture the
derivative role of examining the merits at certification.  As discussed
earlier, the existence of class-wide issues might be clear even if the
issues themselves are not because of ongoing disputes on the merits.
The standard for summary judgment has a much greater affinity
to the two-level analysis needed for certification.  To oversimplify only
a little, the current standard for summary judgment under Rule 56—
whether there is a “genuine dispute as to any material fact”59—could
be modified to fit the elements of Rule 23, and in particular, the
requirement of commonality, simply by adding a single phrase—
“common to the class as a whole.”  At least in form, Rule 56 looks to
the nature of the issues before the court, although, of course, it also
looks to the merits.  The rule requires an examination of the record
to determine the existence of issues warranting trial, just as a motion
for certification searches for issues warranting class-wide determina-
tion.  When certification involves an examination of the evidence, the
accepted standards for summary judgment can be easily adapted to
that end.
The adaptation must proceed by recognizing the usual sequence
of motions in pretrial practice, from motions to dismiss at the plead-
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (formulating
the Hand formula). But Professor Laycock points out that not only do the variables
involved resist any kind of factual quantification, but that the variables cannot even be
“conceptualized . . . in theory as having discrete values . . . . Rather, these variables
stand for ranges of possible developments, with the probabilities changing at every
point of the range.” DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
120 (1991).  Problems of variable factual and conceptual precision are only multi-
plied in the class action context.
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
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ing stage, to certification after limited discovery, and then to full dis-
covery and summary judgment.  This order sometimes varies, most
frequently if the defendant would prefer a quick dismissal of the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim, even if it is not binding on the class.
The statute of limitations might then operate to preclude further liti-
gation on behalf of class members who have not filed pending claims.
If the defendant (or the plaintiff also) wants to resolve the merits
before certification, then the flexibility in timing recognized in the
current rule enables them to do so.60  A motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim provides them with another vehicle for adjudication
insofar as questions of law can be resolved before certification.
The existing vehicles for addressing the merits before trial work
well enough, in fact, that they raise the question whether a separate
inquiry into the merits tailored to the requirements of Rule 23 has any
point at all.  If the relevant legal issues can be resolved on the plead-
ings and the triable issues of material fact can be resolved on summary
judgment, why look at them again in ruling on a motion for certifica-
tion?  The trial court could just consolidate motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment with motions to certify.  The standard
answer goes back to timing and the preclusive effect of a judgment in
a class action.  The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 sought to eliminate
the practice of “one-way intervention” under the previous version of
the rule.61  Under the predecessor to Rule 23(b)(3), “spurious class
actions” for damages could result in a judgment entered before mem-
bership in the class was conclusively determined.62  In those cases,
class members had the option to take advantage of a favorable judg-
ment on liability by intervening to join the class action and obtain
relief, or of staying on the sidelines and avoiding the preclusive effect
of a judgment in favor of the defendant.63  The 1966 version of the
rule therefore insisted upon early decisions on certification so that the
preclusive effect of any resulting judgment could be settled before a
ruling on the merits.
Resolving a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment
before certification under the current rule has the same lopsided
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee’s notes (2003
amendments).
61 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s notes (1966 amendments)
(“Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded; the action
will have been early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the former
case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class, as above stated.”).
62 Id.
63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee’s notes (1966
amendments).
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preclusive effect as one-way intervention under the old rule.  If the
case is dismissed before the class is certified, the class is not bound by
it at all,64 and in general, the longer certification is delayed, the
greater the risk of effectively returning to the practice of one-way
intervention.  The drafters of the current version of the rule were will-
ing to run this risk, but only within limits.  Rule 23(c)(1)(A) still
requires rulings on certification at “an early practicable time.”65
Delay, to the extent appropriate, can be accommodated within this
language or the adjacent provision in Rule 23(c)(1)(C) allowing rul-
ings on certification to be re-examined at any time in the proceedings.
Wal-Mart insists that the plaintiff “affirmatively demonstrate” that the
requirements of Rule 23 have been met.66  Failure to meet that bur-
den ordinarily should result in denial of certification, just as a plain-
tiff’s failure to meet the burden of production in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment should ordinarily result in dismissal.67
By the same token, however, the reasons that support postponing rul-
ing on one motion support postponing ruling on the other.  The over-
riding concern should be to keep rulings on certification, insofar as
they implicate the merits, consistent with rulings on summary judg-
ment.  If the two get out of sync, certification might be denied despite
the existence of class-wide issues that should go to trial.  A motion to
certify by the plaintiff should not be denied when a motion for sum-
mary judgment by the defendant, raising the same issues on the mer-
its, would also be denied.
The two motions, of course, do not entirely overlap.  Because of
the derivative nature of the inquiry into the merits on certification, it
does not replicate all the elements of a ruling on summary judgment
but might leave open crucial issues on the merits.  Suppose, for
instance, that in Wal-Mart the plaintiffs had submitted evidence of spe-
cific aspects of the company’s “corporate culture” that inclined super-
visors and managers to disfavor women, such as a policy against
promoting single parents.  Even if such a facially neutral policy had a
disparate impact on women, it still could be justified as “job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”68
The question whether such a policy applies to the entire class differs
64 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011) (holding that if a class is not
certified, there is no preclusion of later action seeking class certification); Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900–01 (2008) (holding that there is no preclusion by virtual
representation without privity with party to prior action).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
66 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
67 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
68 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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from the question whether it violates Title VII, and the former can be
answered affirmatively without reaching the latter.
By contrast, if the disputed questions were whether the employer
had such a policy or whether the policy had an adverse impact upon
women, the merits would be much more deeply intertwined with certi-
fication.  On one reading of Wal-Mart, the plaintiff would have to
prove these facts in order to establish commonality.  The policy’s exis-
tence and effects would have to generate more than common ques-
tions.  These questions would also have to generate common answers
on the defendant’s liability to individual class members, which in the
absence of any policy or effect, they would not.  Yet if the evidence
supported reasonable inferences either way on these questions, the
necessary common answers should be found to be present.  The case
should survive a motion for summary judgment and go to trial (or
more realistically, the defendant could justifiably be forced into seri-
ous settlement negotiations) on class-wide issues of liability.  Just as
evidence of a general defense of business justification would support
class-wide adjudication, the plaintiff’s production of evidence support-
ing a finding that a specific practice caused disparate impact on the
basis of sex should do the same.  The standard for meeting the bur-
den of production in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
should be sufficient to resolve issues on the merits relating to
certification.
That standard has other features, explored by Kevin Clermont, in
the related context of proving jurisdictional facts that overlap with the
merits.  He would find prima facie evidence of such overlapping facts
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction.69  Taking “prima facie” to mean suffi-
cient to satisfy the burden of production, his approach would also
result in application of the standard for summary judgment.
Although he supports a weaker showing in some contexts, he rightly
rejects proof of the disputed facts themselves.70  Such findings of fact,
if made in a preliminary jurisdictional ruling, would risk prejudging
the merits without adequate discovery, denying the plaintiff the right
to jury trial, and re-introducing problems of limited preclusion (anal-
ogous to those of one-way intervention under previous class action
practice).71  Most of these problems can be avoided by following the
model of a motion for summary judgment which, when it is denied,
does not preclude further examination of the merits.  Even when it is
69 Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 973 (2006).
70 Id. at 988–90, 998.
71 Id. at 990–92.  For similar arguments, see Marcus, supra note 16, at 354–68; R
George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 727–30 (1980).
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granted in an individual action, it does not preclude other plaintiffs
from bringing similar claims if they can assemble better evidence in
support of their claims than the previous plaintiff.  Class members
after denial of certification are left in no worse position than subse-
quent plaintiffs in a series of individual actions.
A further advantage of this standard can be discerned in its appli-
cation to a case that closely resembles Wal-Mart: the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.72
The plaintiff there represented a class consisting of 700 African-Amer-
ican stock brokers whose average compensation lagged behind that of
white stock brokers.73  In that respect, the case resembled Wal-Mart, as
it did in the crucial issue whether this disparity in pay could be attrib-
uted to a specific employment practice of the defendant.  The case
departed from Wal-Mart, not just in the relatively small size of the
class, but in the plaintiffs’ identification of two specific practices that
might have contributed to the disparity in pay.74  Individual brokers
could choose to work in teams whose performance in bringing in and
servicing accounts was then pooled to determine earnings.75  African-
Americans were chosen to participate in teams at half the rate of
whites.76  Another practice that determined compensation involved
“account distribution”: the allocation of accounts of departing bro-
kers, which was made based on past performance of the brokers com-
peting for the accounts in the same office.77  Both practices were
established by central management and applied throughout the com-
pany although they had subjective components, particularly in the
decision of individual brokers to form teams.78  Both the plaintiffs and
72 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3062 (Oct. 1, 2012).
Another case with the same name subsequently was filed alleging discrimination
against in the operation of Merrill Lynch’s bonus and retention program.  McReyn-
olds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 694 F.3d 873, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2012).
That case was dismissed for failure to state a claim before a class was certified, but not
for reasons that cast doubt upon certification of the class in the earlier case. Id. at
888-89 (reasoning that the class in the later case could pursue their claims, to the
extent they were meritorious, in the earlier case).
73 McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483, 490.
74 Id. at 488.
75 Id. at 488–89.
76 Expert Report of Janice Fanning Madden & Alexander Vekker for Plaintiffs at
68, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 2010 WL 3184179 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 9, 2010) (No. 05 C 6583).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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the defendant submitted expert testimony and statistical evidence on
these practices and their effect on compensation.79
On this record, the district court denied certification of a class,
but the court of appeals reversed in an opinion by Judge Posner.80  He
first distinguished Wal-Mart because of the presence of specific com-
pany policies and their potential effect on compensation, analogizing
the formation of teams to the creation of “little fraternities”:
[A]s in fraternities the brokers choose as team members people
who are like themselves.  If they are white, they, or some of them
anyway, are more comfortable teaming with other white brokers.
Obviously they have their eyes on the bottom line; they will join a
team only if they think it will result in their getting paid more, and
they would doubtless ask a superstar broker to join their team
regardless of his or her race.  But there is bound to be uncertainty
about who will be effective in bringing and keeping shared clients;
and when there is uncertainty people tend to base decisions on
emotions and preconceptions, for want of objective criteria.
. . . .
And likewise with regard to account distributions: if as a result
of racial preference at the team level black brokers employed by
Merrill Lynch find it hard to join teams, or at least good teams, and
as a result don’t generate as much revenue or attract and retain as
many clients as white brokers do, then they will not do as well in the
competition for account distributions; and a kind of vicious cycle
will set in.81
This passage in the opinion offers no more than impressionistic
reasoning about how discrimination by individual brokers could result
in disparate impact against the entire class.  It certainly could be dis-
puted, as it was by Merrill Lynch, which offered evidence that traced
the disparity in pay to the reduced contacts that African-American
brokers had, apart from their employment, with potential customers
who were wealthy.82  Whether or not this evidence negates the infer-
ences to be drawn from the plaintiff’s statistics on the reduced pres-
ence of African-Americans on teams and the reduced value of account
distributions to them,83 it does pose the right question: whether these
direct consequences of the company’s policies connected discrimina-
tion by individual white brokers with the pattern of lower pay for Afri-
79 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 2010 WL 3184179,
at *4, *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2010) (No. 05 C 6583).
80 McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 482.
81 Id. at 489–90.
82 McReynolds, 2010 WL 3184179, at *6.
83 Id. at *5.
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can-American brokers, and in particular, whether the plaintiffs could
survive a motion for summary judgment on this issue.
A version of this last question was presented in Wal-Mart, but the
plaintiffs there did less to fill in the missing pieces in a far larger puz-
zle, leaving even the dissent searching far afield for further evi-
dence.84  The Seventh Circuit did not have to go so far to certify the
class in McReynolds.  It might have reached the wrong result, but it did
so on grounds distinguishable from those in Wal-Mart—at least on the
issue of commonality.  In other respects, as we shall see in the next
part of this article, the decision could be criticized as inconsistent
both with Wal-Mart and with the structure of Rule 23.  The Seventh
Circuit ordered the class to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) and lim-
ited it to the issue of injunctive relief under Rule 23(c)(4), preserving
the ability of class members to individually seek compensatory relief
based on a finding of class-wide liability.85  The need to resort to such
expedients, which follow a long tradition of manipulating Rule 23 in
order to reach sensible results, depends upon the absence of alterna-
tives more consistent with the literal terms of the rule.  Part III takes
up this subject and examines the influence, if not the command, of
substantive law in devising these alternatives.
III. THE EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW:  REMEDIES,
SETTLEMENT, AND CERTIFICATION
Most of the scholarship on Rule 23 rests on the unspoken
assumption that analysis of the rule must be segmented into different
fields of substantive law in order to offer an analysis at an informative
level of detail.  Articles have focused on class actions in areas such as
mass torts, securities, civil rights, employment discrimination, con-
sumer fraud, and antitrust.86  Some are even narrower, examining
84 Justice Ginsburg relied, for instance, upon evidence of sex discrimination in
orchestral auditions.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 n.6 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491–92.
86 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 701 (2012) (arguing that securities fraud class actions should be treated as
derivative actions because of the unique issues of adequate representation in the
securities fraud legal context); Coffee, supra note 15, at 318–25 (analyzing develop- R
ments under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Brandon Garrett, Aggregation
and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2012) (arguing for a prominent
role for class actions to enforce constitutional rights); David Marcus, Flawed But Noble:
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV.
657, 678–94 (2011) (examining the origins of Rule 23(b)(2) and its assumptions
about solidarity among civil rights plaintiffs); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 838 (2002)
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only asbestos litigation or only tobacco claims.87  Others take a
broader view.  One influential study has examined class actions for
damages certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and concluded with a chapter
on “The Great Big Question About Class Actions.”88  That question, as
the authors framed it, is whether damages class actions “on balance,
serve the public well.”89  Yet the limitation of their study to damage
class actions and their focus primarily upon consumer class actions
makes it clear that this single large question quickly dissolves into
many subsidiary questions.90  One of those questions concerns the
scope of subdivision (b)(3), as opposed to subdivision (b)(2), an issue
that came up in both Wal-Mart and McReynolds.
Judicial decisions do not, in so many words, tailor application of
Rule 23 to different claims, but at crucial points they invoke the sub-
stantive law to determine whether the rule’s requirements have been
met.91  Just as it did on the issue of commonality, the majority in Wal-
Mart relied on the substantive law to disapprove of certification under
subdivision (b)(2) of class actions seeking back pay.  Like damages,
the Court reasoned, awards of back pay had to be determined on an
individualized basis rather than through statistical approximation,
requiring certification of the class under subdivision (b)(3), typically
used for damage class actions, rather than subdivision (b)(2), used for
injunctions.92  The Court denounced the resort to statistics in these
(arguing for the relevance of tort law as opposed to a narrow “proceduralist” analysis
of class actions).
87 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litiga-
tion After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1930–32 (2002) (grounding analy-
sis of mass torts class actions in the empirical specifics of modern asbestos litigation);
see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Puni-
tive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 979 (2001) (analyzing the impact of class actions on tobacco tort
litigation); Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 331, 332–47 (2001) (analyzing tobacco class actions and their effects).
88 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 401–70 (2000).
89 Id. at 401.
90 They readily concede the significance of the merits and substantive law in
assessing the overall utility of class actions, even if they recognize how elusive the
answers to even narrower questions are. Id. at 416–24.
91 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (emphasizing the risk
of abridging substantive rights under state tort law of asbestos victims based on a lib-
eral interpretation of “limited fund” class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594–95 (1997) (finding no adequate representa-
tion because of the diversity of present and potential medical injuries from exposure
to asbestos); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting certification of a class in part because of varied state tort law).
92 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
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circumstances as “Trial by Formula” in a part of the opinion joined by
all the Justices.93  The Court’s unanimity on this point was all the
more surprising because it was unnecessary to the decision.  The
Court correctly held that class actions seeking substantial amounts of
back pay—and in Wal-Mart back pay would have amounted to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars—do not fit within the terms of subdivision
(b)(2), which require “final injunctive relief . . . appropriate respect-
ing the class as a whole.”94  Individual awards of compensatory relief,
whether in the form of damages or back pay, vary from one class
member to another and might be denied for some class members alto-
gether.  They are not, like a class-wide injunction, “appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.”
On its face, the opinion in Wal-Mart rejects sampling as any basis
for approximate relief, at both the remedy phase of a class action and
at certification.95  Yet the undoubted supremacy of substantive law in
determining remedies does not make sampling irrelevant to certifica-
tion.  If it did, it would have the perverse effect of sacrificing the very
improvement that class actions offer over individual litigation in
enforcing substantive rights.  Class actions make the greatest differ-
ence in cases when approximate relief provides the only effective
means of deterrence and compensation.  Nothing in the law on reme-
dies, at least under Title VII, prevents “bifurcation” of a class action
into class-wide and individual phases.  The opinion in Wal-Mart itself
noted this feature of Title VII law, which originated in the first wave of
Title VII class actions and government enforcement actions.96  These
decisions, focused upon remedies, presupposed some form of aggre-
gate litigation that can be divided into class-wide and individual com-
ponents: usually class-wide determination of liability, including
consideration of class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief, followed by
individualized determinations of individual compensatory relief.  In
this respect, Title VII does not negate, but instead supports, certifica-
tion of class actions for individual relief.
After Wal-Mart, class actions seeking back pay must be certified
under subdivision (b)(3), with its enhanced requirements of predomi-
nance of class-wide issues over individual issues, and if a class is certi-
fied, the right of class members to notice and to opt-out.  The
possibility of “Trial by Formula” can no longer be used to dilute these
93 Id. at 2561.
94 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
95 Wal-Mart, 131. S. Ct. at 2561.
96 Id.
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requirements.97  Nevertheless, since most class actions settle before
trial, and virtually all result in settlement at the remedy stage, even
after a finding of liability, “Settlement by Formula” remains a realistic
prospect even if “Trial by Formula” is barred.  Most class actions result
in the award of some form of approximate relief granted by agree-
ment between the parties.  The question is whether the evolution of
class actions towards “Settlement by Formula” after certification sup-
ports consideration of this factor in making the certification decision
itself.
The early decisions on remedies under Title VII took the propri-
ety of certification for granted.  The decisions established a presump-
tion in favor of back pay upon a finding of class-wide liability.98  This
presumption was then extended to other forms of individual relief,
such as remedial seniority, and from private class actions to public
pattern-or-practice actions.99  The latter resemble class actions insofar
as they seek relief for a class of victims of discrimination, but they are
brought by public officials and they are not binding on class members
who choose not to participate in them.100  In the leading decision on
remedies in such actions, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, the Supreme Court observed that allocating relief among iden-
tified victims of discrimination necessarily involves “a degree of
approximation and imprecision.”101  Remedial questions that involve
a combination of individualized decision-making and necessary
approximation have not stood in the way of certification.  In damage
class actions certified under subdivision (b)(3), the First Circuit has
noted that “individuation of damages in consumer class actions is
rarely determinative under Rule 23(b)(3).”102  That proposition
might well be tested in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,103 which the Supreme
97 Id.
98 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
99 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–35 (1977); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767–68 (1976).
100 Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 332–33 (1980).
101 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 372.
102 Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003).  For deci-
sions after Wal-Mart certifying class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) despite the presence
of individual claims for damages, see In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Prods. Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409, 421 (6th Cir. 2012); Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667
F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (7th Cir. 2012); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644
F.3d 604, 618–20 (8th Cir. 2011); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 296–301 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
103 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 11-864, 2012 WL 113090 (U.S. June 25, 2012)
(granting certiorari).
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Court has recently decided to hear.104  Among the questions
presented there is whether the plaintiff presented adequate evidence
of class-wide issues to support certification of an antitrust class action.
Yet wholly apart from adjudication of questions based on approxi-
mate relief, settlement on such terms remains the norm.  As the Prin-
ciples of the Law of Aggregate Litigation of the American Law
Institute recognize, class actions and other forms of aggregate litiga-
tion “may also be settled on terms that may include remedies not avail-
able in contested lawsuits.”105  This principle simply codifies existing
practice, in which the parties’ incentive to settle leads them to adopt
approximate forms of relief.  As a leading study commented, “most
judges anticipate that parties to a mass tort class action will settle the
individual damage claims without trial.”106  They forego the cost of
continued litigation which, in theory, might result in remedies more
precisely tailored to the characteristics of individual class members,
but only at the expense of greater litigation.  The parties avoid this
expense typically by substituting formulas in which the compensation
awarded to class members is determined according to characteristics
that can be readily ascertained, such as the nature of the injury, the
amount of medical expenses, other property loss, and lost income of
class members.107  The formulas then yield tables compiled with mul-
tiple variables that approximate the relief due to class members.
The reliance upon such approximations only increases after certi-
fication, which leads to settlement at over twice the rate of settlement
in cases not certified.108  This rate further increases after a finding of
liability, especially under fee-shifting statutes, like those under Title
VII and other civil rights laws.109  Under those statutes, defendants
become liable for the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees from the beginning of
the action until it is concluded, so long as the plaintiffs obtain signifi-
104 Id.
105 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.01(b)
(2009).
106 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 88, at 111. R
107 The case studies of damage class actions in HENSLER ET AL., supra note 88, all R
resulted in settlements approximating relief in this fashion. Id. at 454–59.  For exam-
ples of such “settlement grids” see Issacharoff, supra note 87, at 1928–29, 1934–35 R
(noting agreement on value of asbestos claims and use of settlement grids); George
Rutherglen, Distributing Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and the Leg-
acy of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L 673, 692–95 (2005)
(noting use of presumptive awards in Dalkon Shield and September 11th settlement
funds).
108 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 40, at 60 (higher rate of settlement of certified R
cases, not counting those certified only for settlement).
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (2006).
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cant relief and no “special circumstances” make the award of fees
unjust.110  At the remedy phase of a class action, defendants face a
large and growing bill for all the expenses of litigation, both their own
and the plaintiffs’.  Although the amount of attorney’s fees awarded is
subject to overall limits based on the degree of the plaintiffs’ success
on the merits, the actual calculation is by the “lodestar method” of
multiplying the hours reasonably spent in the representation by a rea-
sonable hourly rate.111  A plaintiff’s fees in overcoming opposition to
individual relief, more often than not, would just be added to the
lodestar calculation of fees awarded, leaving the defendant to face the
risk of indefinitely rising costs after a finding of liability.  Those costs
only add to the defendant’s incentives to settle, which already have
been multiplied by the effect of certification in exposing it to class-
wide liability.112  After Wal-Mart, defendants can insist upon the right
to contest the award of compensatory relief to individual class mem-
bers, but they can exercise that right only if they are willing to foot the
entire bill for continued litigation.
To put this point another way, Title VII gives defendants the sub-
stantive right to limit the relief ordered against them, and Rule 23
cannot take it away, but other provisions of substantive law can.  As
Wal-Mart emphasized, the Rules Enabling Act requires that the rule
“not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,”113 and even
more fundamentally, the Due Process Clause guarantees defendants
the opportunity to be heard on every disputed issue.114  Yet substan-
tive law can both expand and restrict substantive rights, as fee-shifting
statutes do in imposing added costs on defendants after a finding of
liability.  Of course, defendants might have that finding reversed, but
it is the ex ante exposure to liability that compels them to settle, not
the possibility of ex post vindication.  The dynamics of settlement, not
the terms of Rule 23, compromise the value of defendants’ procedural
rights in the remedy phase of a class action.
110 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1978) (citing
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
111 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
112 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).  The “in
terrorem” of effect of certification upon defendants has been widely accepted in the
secondary literature and among the class action bar. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 88, at R
106–08; Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1291–1305. R
113 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
114 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportu-
nity to present their objections.”).
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Should the incentives for settlement later in the case be taken
into account earlier, when the decision whether or not to certify is
made?  It would be odd if the likely course of litigation after certifica-
tion had no influence on how the certification decision was made.  As
we saw in Part I, judges routinely take account of the plaintiffs’ likeli-
hood of success on the merits, whether they acknowledge it or not.
Since most cases settle, that assessment realistically encompasses the
prospect of settlement on terms favorable to the class.  Yet it would be
equally odd if the likelihood of settlement determined the decision to
certify, since certification itself affects the probability of settlement.
Cases that are not certified are likely to be dropped, resulting in no
significant settlement for the class, while cases that are certified usu-
ally proceed immediately to serious settlement negotiations.115  Certi-
fication and settlement could easily become joint components of a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
The way out of this circularity is to recognize the way that settle-
ment matters, like the merits matter in Part II: not in determining the
ultimate question whether the class will get relief, but in determining
the derivative question whether relief could be awarded predomi-
nantly by resolution of common issues rather than individual issues.  If
a class-wide finding of liability exercises only a weak influence over
individual class members’ entitlement to relief, then common issues
are not likely to predominate, either in settlement or in adjudication.
Conversely, if such a finding establishes a strong presumption that all
class members have been victims of discrimination, then relief is sus-
ceptible to efficient class-wide determination and common issues
predominate.  All of this depends upon the nature of the plaintiffs’
claims and the record developed at certification.  A plaintiff cannot
short-circuit this inquiry by pointing to the likelihood of settlement if
the case is certified and reaches the remedy phase.  Nor can the
defendant do the same by adamantly insisting that it will never settle
any aspect of the case.
The willingness of the Supreme Court to entertain “settlement
only” class actions, left open in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, lends
support to this conclusion.116  There the parties had already reached a
settlement before the class had been certified.  In a contested certifi-
cation decision, settlement remains only a probability and the court’s
assessment necessarily remains predictive.  Past experience reveals
both the frequency and the terms on which class actions are resolved
by agreement of the parties.  Few, if any, class actions proceed to an
115 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 40, at 60–61, 179–80. R
116 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-2\NDL207.txt unknown Seq: 26 28-JAN-13 16:43
896 notre dame law review [vol. 88:2
indefinite number of individual hearings stretching out, like the Rule
Against Perpetuities, beyond lives in being. Amchem dealt with a situa-
tion in which the probability of settlement was set at one.  It need not
be set in all other cases to zero.  Established practice demonstrates, in
Title VII class actions and in those in other fields, that an intermediate
value can be found and that, for the remedy phase of a case, it more
closely approaches one than zero.
None of this is to say that a class action could—or could not—
have been certified under subdivision (b)(3) in Wal-Mart.  The
Court’s holding that there was no commonality precluded certifica-
tion under any subdivision of the rule and the Court’s opinion went
no further than preventing certification under subdivision (b)(2) of
class actions seeking significant awards of back pay.  Courts have rou-
tinely certified cases involving damage class actions under subdivision
(b)(3) despite the fact that the relief awarded to individual class mem-
bers must, if the defendant insists, be done in individualized proceed-
ings.  The same might have been true in an alternative version of Wal-
Mart in which the threshold showing of commonality had been met.
To take an example mentioned earlier, if women had been the victims
of discrimination based on a policy of not promoting single parents,
the effect of that policy on individual women could be ascertained
more easily than the effect of the alleged discrimination in subjective
decision-making in the actual case.  A narrower class of women would
have been affected and the instances of actual discrimination more
easily ascertained, enough so that approximate disposition of their
cases could feasibly be resolved by settlement.
The same surmise could be made on the facts of McReynolds.
Among the 700 African-American stock brokers in that class action,
only some would have been victims of the company policies determin-
ing pay by team membership and past performance, and only some
fraction of their pay would have been affected by those policies.
Upon a finding of liability, the parties could have settled the individ-
ual claims for back pay on that basis.  Instead of predicting a settle-
ment on these grounds, and certifying a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), the Seventh Circuit adopted the awkward expedient of certify-
ing one for an injunction under subdivision (b)(2).117  The court
then left the preclusive effect of any judgment of liability to be deter-
mined by collateral estoppel, allowing class members to invoke non-
mutual offensive issue preclusion in support of any claim they had for
117 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482,
491–92 (7th Cir. 2012).
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back pay.118  That reasoning, while inventive, circumvents the
restraints on this form of issue preclusion—designed to prevent pro-
spective plaintiffs from adopting a wait-and-see strategy with respect to
pending litigation119—and the similar restraints on class actions
under subdivision (b)(3)—designed under the modern rule to pre-
vent “one-way intervention.”120  The court allows class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment and avoid an unfavorable one.
Reliance upon the likelihood of settlement, although necessarily pre-
dictive and uncertain, does not similarly flout existing restraints on
preclusion.
This part of the article has sought to dispel doubts that sampling
and statistical approximation have no role to play in certification deci-
sions after Wal-Mart.  The Court was right to insist upon the crucial
role of substantive law in making such decisions, but wrong to imply
that it reinforces anachronistic tendencies that anchor class action
practice to traditional procedures appropriate only for individual
actions.  Rule 23 does have the limited role that the Court assigned to
it: creating basic procedures that conform to the Rules Enabling Act
and the Due Process Clause.  The constitutional requirements of
notice and adequacy of representation have certain constant features
and the rule as a whole is framed at a sufficiently high level of abstrac-
tion to apply to virtually any claim.  In these respects the rule aspires
to be “trans-substantive,” mainly by serving as a skeleton to be fleshed
out by reference to substantive law.121  But the Court was wrong to rely
upon substantive law to reject modern methods of sampling.  These
are supported, not undermined, by Title VII, which from the begin-
ning has relied upon class actions and other aggregate forms of litiga-
tion to give relief to individual employees.  There is no need, either as
a matter of procedure or substance, to abandon this goal and to sacri-
fice the very improvements that class actions offer over individual
litigation.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the emphasis on substantive law offered in this
article, Wal-Mart might be read more for its effect on Title VII than
118 Id. at 492.
119 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (limiting this form of
preclusion “where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action”).
120 See supra note 61. R
121 See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732–33 (1975) (expressing skepticism about procedural rules
that are interpreted uniformly to cover a wide range of claims).
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for its interpretation of Rule 23.  On that reading, the case stands for
the increasing acceptance by the Supreme Court of neutral employ-
ment practices that incorporate substantial elements of subjective
decision-making.  Claims of disparate impact, although still theoreti-
cally available against such practices,122 remain constrained by the
need to identify the precise way in which they cause adverse effects
upon the plaintiff class.  The Court has imposed similar constraints on
claims of disparate impact in another recent case, Ricci v. DeStefano,123
and it might have done so implicitly in Wal-Mart.
A substantive interpretation of the decision is the subject for
another article, but it intersects with the analysis offered here.  As
argued in Parts I and II of this Article, the dominance of substantive
law forms the major premise of most applications of the rule, both
realistically in how judges make decisions and formalistically in giving
content to the rule.  Accordingly, as argued in Part III, the continued
prevalence of “Settlement by Formula” should serve as an antidote to
Wal-Mart’s rejection of “Trial by Formula.”  This example also pro-
vides a lesson for future application of the rule: notwithstanding
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, substantive law does not
always point in a conservative direction.  Instead, it points the only way
forward after Wal-Mart.
122 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011) (acknowledg-
ing the application of disparate impact to subjective decision-making).
123 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (finding that a test with disparate
impact could have been justified as job related).
